137^th SIGNAL RADIO INTELLIGENCE COMPANY

UTAH BEACH TO NEUENKIRCHEN 1944-45

By Edward H. Ioanes

Editor: Edward H. Ioanes was a Radio Intercept Operator, High Speed (MOS 738) with the 137^th SRIC. Ed has written a two volume history of the unit from it's activation on February 14, 1942, at Mitchel Field, NY to it's deactivation on December 12, 1945, at Fort Jackson, SC. Ed has allowed us to edit and use excerpts from his work which will cover the unit's movements within the European Theater of Operations (ETO.) Arriving in Glasgow, Scotland, on April 17, 1944 the unit was primarily stationed at Madam Ostaburg's College for Girls in Dartford, Kent, until it's departure for the Continent on August 29-30, 1944.

Utah Beach - Departing Southampton on September 1^st, the Liberty Ship George W. Lively arrived off Utah Beach that same evening. Debarkation was completed on September 3-4 and forward elements of the unit bivouacked at Periers, France, on September 3^rd, following the same route that the 114^th and 116^th SRIC's had followed

Rennes Forest - Departing Periers on September 6^th, the unit moved to the Rennes Forest. The area where the 137^th SRIC encamped was about nine miles from the city of Rennes itself. The time there was spent setting up and testing their technical equipment to determine if the recent voyage and convoy movements had damaged the equipment in any way. No actual operations were in effect but practice intercepts of friendly units and practice DF "shots" availed the unit of some actual operational experience. During the last several days at this location the unit first began intercept and DF operations against the enemy forces.

Verdun, France - Departing the Rennes area on September 17^th, the unit first moved to Aveze, thence to Rozay on the 18^th and subsequently to Verdun on September 19, 1944. The movement of the unit was done over a period of three days involving three separate segments of the unit. This allowed the unit to maintain complete coverage in the intercept mission and operations continued without interruption. Intercept Headquarters was located Amel with operations consisting of four shifts working an average of 18 positions. DF sites were established at locations between Sovrey & Arrancy-Sur-Crusnes, between Ornel & Foameix, and in Villleen Woevre. The TA Unit decoded intercepted messages when possible and analyzed all traffic copied whether successfully decoded or not. On September 20, 1944, the unit was put under the operational control of Signal Security Detachment "D", Twelfth Army Group. At the same time the 3254^th Signal Service Company operations were to be coordinated and directed through the 137^th SRIC. Within the 137^th SRIC, DF Control maintained contact with and between the locations by way of radio. One of the advantages to this was that the mobility of the sites was greatly enhanced. The disadvantages were the need for a second operator and the use of one time pads for encryption and authenticators.

Valkenburg, Holland - Departing the Verdun area the unit moved to Hollenfels, Luxembourg, in two segments on the dates of October 8^th and 10^th, arriving in Hollenfels later on their respective departure dates. Maintaining continuous operations throughout, the unit was in Hollenfels for only a short time. Again in two segment, on October 15-16, 1944, the unit moved to Valkenburg, Holland. The DF sites were located at Merkelbeek, Gulpen and Sittard, all in Holland. By the end of November the latter two sites had moved to Stolberg and Obernez, Germany, respectively.

On October 31^st experimental coverage of enemy VHF R/T (Very High Frequency) (Radio-Telephone) transmissions began with two positions assigned to the mission. Although R/T coverage was already a part of the company's mission, it had not been done in the VHF range.

Valkenburg was to be one of the longest stays that the unit encountered. Interception and DF coverage of the German's 116^th Panzer Division, 10^th Panzer Division, 15^th Panzer Grenadier and the 1^st SS Division were parts of the unit's mission. VHF voice interception continued through November with no significant intelligence gained. On November 1^st the Germans changed their operational procedures and call-signs causing a lot of hard work before they could identify their former targets with complete assurance.

During this time frame the unit recognized the superior quality of the Hammerlund Super-Pro and forwarded requests for up-grading their equipment.

Battle of the Bulge - As with any military setback there is always the question of how it occurred and why the intelligence organizations didn't forecast the possibility. The following was reported by Paul Seton, who was a member of the 137^th Traffic Analysis Section, some fifty-odd years after the fact. "I assume you know all about the information the Traffic Analysis Section had gathered about the Bulge offensive, how we forwarded the information to Ninth Army, then to First Army and finally to Twelfth Army Group only to be ignored and finally reprimanded for going out of channels. That was five days before the German offensive. It was also when [Captain Michael F.] Mishley (CO) had us packed up and stacked the trucks with enough gas to get to Antwerp in case we were cut off by the Germans heading for Liege." When asked for more information Paul wrote, "As for the bulge stuff, our first warning went to Ninth Army Intelligence on 10 December and we were told the following day that it wasn't our front. The message then went to First Army Intelligence and we were told they had their own signal intelligence. Finally we went to 12^th Army Group and we were again told to go through channels." George Miller, who was in the DF Plotting Section, also tells that we were ignored and then reprimanded when we persisted, the same as Paul Seton reports. [Editor's note: See Jay Van Werlhof's article "One Man's Decision" for his perspective of the 114^th SRIC regarding this issue. His article is located on our web site under the historical references section.]

The Högen DF site, which had been relocated from Stolberg, was fortunate enough to have a half track mounting a pair of 40mm antiaircraft weapons about two hundred yards from the direction finder. There was another half track, this one mounting twin caliber .50 machine guns, about a quarter of a mile from the DF. On one mid-morning a German Me-109 flew over the DF site at a low altitude and both half tracks opened fire. They obviously hit it because it started to belch smoke and fell to the ground a short distance away. Not too much later another German aircraft flew over at a low altitude. Once again the half tracks opened fire and again hit their target. This plane, a Ju-88, began to smoke and made a crash landing in the field beyond the DF site.

Confusion was not an uncommon occurrence during the breakthrough. On one occasion American aircraft flew over to drop bombs on the German lines but, in error, began dropping them on the Allied side of the front. Al Cornaro and Cliff Fanseen, who were manning the mobile DF, jumped into an adjacent foxhole. While they huddled in the hole a Captain of a nearby anti-aircraft unit rushed up and screamed at Al asking why he had the planes dropping their bombs there. Al answered with screams of his own that if he could control the planes he wouldn't be hiding in a hole. Apparently the Captain thought that the DF was some sort of air control.

Needless to say, the 137^th SRIC was more than aware of what faced them during the period of the German breakthrough in the Ardennes. SIGINT units were just as susceptible to enemy actions as were the combat troops. During the breakthrough the 3250^th Signal Service Company (RI), assigned to the V Corps, suffered a 19% casualty rate and lost a complete DF Detachment. That DF'ers were particularly at risk (because of their nearness to the active front) is made evident by their instructions to keep a five gallon can of gasoline and a phosphorus grenade available at all times in the event the equipment had to be destroyed so as not to fall into enemy hands.

St. Tonis - With the German offensive in the Bulge repulsed, and with the crossing of the Roer River, the 137^th moved its Headquarters and operations to St. Tonis, near Krefeld, on March 7th. There, as the Ninth Army planned and prepared for the assault on the Rhine River, the 137^th worked on gathering intelligence on the German forces east of the Rhine. One of the unusual intercept events occurred during this time-frame as is related by one of the participants, Intercept Operator Bernie Newmark: "It was the late night/early morning shift and I was in a position next to Bill Ritter in one of the mobile intercept trucks. The midnight shift was usually quiet but about 0500 Bill picked up a message which, to his surprise, was in the clear. As was proper procedure, Bill nudged me and told me to get on his frequency. We both copied, in plain language, a message from a German general who wanted to surrender his troops to an American officer. It was an exciting time for us."

The Beginning of the End - By April 4, 1945, the 137^th SRIC had completed its move across the Rhine to Haltern am See, an area that obviously was a resort in the prewar days. Allied troops were moving eastward so rapidly that the stay in Haltern was short lived and on April 11^th the 137^th moved again to the east with Neuenkirchen at Wiedenbrück the destination. The stay there was again a short one for most of the company and on April 15^th, leaving an occupation group in Neuenkirchen, the main body moved to Ampleben near Braunschweig.

Elements of the 137^th SRIC were preparing to cross the Elbe River when orders were received to not cross the Elbe and any elements already across were to return immediately. The 137^th SRIC remained in the Elbe River area until the Russian forces reached the east bank juncture with the American troops. Some members of the 137^th were able to share American cigarets with the Russian allies and in return drank vodka toasts to their shared victory. Finally, on May 10^th, the troops returned to Neuenkirchen where the entire company was reunited.

With the end of hostilities, the Ninth Army became an occupation army and the 137th SRIC's area of responsibility became Neuenkirchen at Wiedenbrück.

While in Neuenkirchen the troops were given passes for places like Paris and Brussels. At one time the CO arranged with a local brewery to produce enough beer so the company could have a beer party. Of course the CO collected contributions from the men to pay for the beer. Baseball equipment was acquired and games began within the company and against other units. Trips were made to places like Paderborn, Bielefeld and Hameln, where the piper supposedly led the rats and children from the town. The unit did stand formations such as reveille and retreat not only to remind the troops that they were still soldiers but also to remind the local populations that they were occupied by the U. S. Army.

Editor's Epilogue: In early June, the unit was sent to Spa, Belgium for R&R. The joy of this much deserved rest was dashed when the unit was informed that they were to be reassigned to the First Army, sent back to the U. S. where they would get Pacific training and be a part of the First Army invasion of Japan. On August 14^th the unit sailed for the U. S. The good news of this event was that Japan surrendered on the same date and V-J Day was proclaimed on August 15, 1945. Their ship docked on August 26 and the company was sent to Camp Kilmer, NJ where they were given 3 day passes and, shortly after, 30 day furloughs. The furloughs were extended by another 15 days and all, who so wished, were discharged. The entire unit was never again reassembled. The officers and some of the enlisted men reported to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, where, at 2400 hours on December 12, 1945, the 137^th Signal Radio Intelligence Company was inactivated.